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Abstract
 Th e proposal to amend R.A. , otherwise known as the Retail Trade 
Nationalization Act of , was contentious as the shift from the protectionist 
to the liberalist mode was considered a drastic policy change. Th e proponents 
questioned the eff ectiveness as well as soundness of the law. Th ey argued that the 
policy was outmoded, was not in tune with global capitalist development, and 
resulted in an ineffi  cient industry. In the process, the stakeholders were drawn 
to two groups, those for liberalizing the retail trade and those for maintaining 
protectionism in the industry. Th e contradicting positions led to a passionate 
debate among the stakeholders and the policy actors. To understand the politics 
of policy change, several essential factors need to be examined: the context, the 
stakeholders and the cost-benefi t equation, the rationale, the political resources 
and the concessions, and public perception. All these factors worked together to 
bring about the enactment of Retail Trade Liberalization Law or R.A.  and 
the repeal of R.A. . Th e experience illustrates the complexities of radical 
policy shift as well as the intricacies of policymaking in the Philippines.
Keywords: liberalization; Philippines; policy change; protectionism; Republic 
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Introduction
 Republic Act (R.A.)  defi nes retail trade as “any act, occupation 
or calling of habitually selling direct to the general public merchandise, 
commodities or goods for consumption.” As the undertaking is basically selling 
to the fi nal user, retailing is considered an industry that ultimately links up 
with the Filipino consumers. 
 Th e proposal to amend the -year-old protectionist policy of the retail 
trade in the  R.A.  was considered contentious, as the shift from 
the protectionist to the liberalist mode is a drastic policy change. Opponents 
contested the move. Th ose benefi ting from the current setup naturally took 
strong actions to maintain the status quo and preserve their advantage. Any 
radical change in society elicits suspicion and distrust among the people. 
Th e latter feared that politicians and powerful groups in society would use 
the occasion to further advance their interests at the expense of the public. 
Furthermore, xenophobic forces argued that opening the retail trade sector to 
foreigners was unpatriotic; and as a critical industry, the retail trade must be kept 
solely in the hands of Filipinos. In contrast, the proponents of policy change 
questioned the eff ectiveness as well as soundness of R.A. . Th ey argued that 
the policy was outmoded, was not in tune with global capitalist development, 
and had resulted in an ineffi  cient industry. Th e contradicting positions led to 
a passionate debate among the stakeholders and the policy actors. 
 To understand the politics of policy change, particularly the radical shift 
from a protectionist to a liberal policy in the retail trade, several essential factors 
need to be examined: the context, the stakeholders and the cost-benefi t equation, 
the rationale, the political resources and concessions, and public perception. 
Th is paper, based on a review of congressional documents and government 
data, is about the interplay of these factors in the enactment of R.A.  and 
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the repeal of R.A. , as the eff ect of each factor combined to bring about 
the policy change. 
Framework of Analysis
 Public policy is often broadly described as “anything a government chooses 
to do or not to do” (Dye, ). Th is defi nition implies that policymaking is a 
governmental activity where policy actors make formal decisions by enacting 
policies to address public issues or concerns. Th e policymaking process often 
consists of agenda setting, discussion, formulation, and approval of the policy. 
Th e process involves engagement among stakeholders: offi  cial government actors 
(i.e., the president, bureaucrats, senators, and congressmen) and societal actors 
(i.e., businessmen, workers, consumers groups, media, the religious sector, 
and international organizations). As the process requires interactions among 
policy actors and the resulting policy creates winners and losers among the 
stakeholders, policymaking is essentially a political game. Understanding the 
politics of policymaking, particularly the success and failure of policy change, 
necessitates the examination of the integral factors of the process (Figure ).
Context
 The context refers to the external political, economic, and social 
environment where the policy formulation process takes place (Birkland, 
). Th e environment can obstruct or facilitate the mobilization of demand 
for the policy, as changing times can create incentives for the stakeholders to 
take action. Th us, policy actors must have the capacity to recognize windows of 
















Figure . Factors aff ecting policy change
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importance of timing, as the “right timing” can provide an ideal circumstance 
for setting the agenda of the policy.
Stakeholders
 Stakeholders are key political actors whose infl uence is critical in the 
policymaking process. Th ey are defi ned as “actors (persons or organizations) 
who have vested interest in the policy being promoted” (Schmeer, ). Th eir 
interests, declared or conceivable, should be taken into account, as they can 
potentially aff ect the dynamics of the process. “Political analysis should identify 
whose toes will be stepped on, who expect their toes to be stepped on, and how 
diff erent groups are likely to react when their toes are stepped on, or when they 
think their toes will be stepped on” (Reich, ). Stakeholders’ participation 
as well as their support or opposition in pursuit of their interests may be seen 
as the ammunition by which the proposed policy will be settled. 
Costs and benefi ts refer to the distribution of actual and perceived gains 
and losses among the stakeholders. Identifying the actual as well as potential 
winners and losers with regard to the policy is essential, as the apportionment of 
the costs and benefi ts exposes the process to potential confl icts or opportunities 
that can signifi cantly aff ect the feasibility of the policy. One typical problem 
encountered by policy advocates is what Mancur Olsen () called a collective 
action dilemma. Th e dilemma happens when the costs are immediately felt and 
concentrated on a small group while the benefi ts have long-term impact and 
spread to a larger group. Th is scenario creates strong incentives for the former 
and disincentives for the latter to mobilize for collective action. Moreover, the 
situation intensifi es when, on one hand, the small group is highly organized, 
economically powerful, and politically well connected and the other or larger 
group is not organized, is economically weak, and politically less infl uential 
(Reich, ). 
Rationalization
Rationalization refers to the arguments off ered by policy actors to justify 
their positions and the policy. To be credible and compelling, arguments for a 
position must be logical, consistent with empirical evidence, and contemporarily 
relevant. Th e rationale for a policy must off er solution to a problem, be able 
to refute the counterarguments, and, more importantly, be able to project an 
aura of “correctness.” Specifi cally, rationalization must show that the advantages 
outweigh the disadvantages of the policy change. Th e goal is to alter the 
equation of stakeholders by convincing the undecided and reluctant actors and 
by strengthening the commitment of advocates. 
Political Resources and Concessions
Political resources refer to the capacity to use power, authority, and 
money to infl uence the policymaking process by enticing allies and pressuring 
2010 © University of the Philippines Mindanao
25BRILLO | BANWA VOL. 7, NO. 1 (2010): 21–39
opponents. Resources can be employed in many ways. Th ey can take a benign 
form, such as informational support to enhance expertise, particularly the 
capacity to articulate and defend the policy position, or an audacious form, 
such as “side payments” (e.g., assurance of budget allocation and release of 
public funds, appointment to lucrative government positions, or outright cash 
in the form of bonuses) to create incentives to directly infl uence the behavior 
of policy actors. Here, the policymaking process is considered a transaction, 
where bargains and exchanges take place among policy actors (Stein et al., 
). Each transaction entered into bears costs, and these costs are paid off  
through side payments (Haggard and McCubbins, ). Th e use of side 
payments in a political environment where patronage politics persists and 
elections are expensive can be very enticing for actors to climb the bandwagon 
for or against the policy.
Concessions in policymaking refer also to bargains and exchanges where 
the policy actors negotiate among themselves the content and the fi nal form 
of the policy. Th e bargains and exchanges among policy actors are a give-and-
take process that usually results in compromises, as policy proponents try to 
accommodate the demands of the opposition (Howlett and Ramesh, ). 
Concessions are needed to persuade doubting lawmakers, to appease the 
opposing lawmakers, and to erase fears on the side of the public. Concessions 
over the policy are made by inserting stipulations, removing provisions, or 
attaching exemptions. Th e eff ect of the practice is twofold: one, it dilutes the 
policy, and two, it ensures the passage of the policy. 
Public Perception
Public perception refers to the shaping of public opinion. Infl uencing 
public perception is important in policymaking. In a political system where 
lawmakers seek to win elections, public opinion is critical to infl uence the 
behavior of policy actors. As rule of thumb, lawmakers usually go along with 
and rarely go against popular opinion. It follows that winning the battle for 
public perception would translate into pressures on the lawmakers, a boost for 
the policy proponents, and marginalization for the opposition.
Th e key is to create in the public mind the idea that the policy serves the 
public well-being. Policy advocates not only must be cautious in presenting 
the issue and alternatives but must also use language suitable for the public 
audience. At present, media is the main platform used to reach out to the public. 
In an open and competitive political environment, eff ective handling of media 
is essential to convey the “right” message to the people. 
In a democracy where policy proposals go through the political process 
and are decided by votes, care in considering the right timing, accounting of 
interests, appreciation of costs and benefi ts, proper rationalization, employment 
of resources, utilization of bargains and exchanges, and the shaping of public 
opinion can translate into a greater chance of enacting or stalling the proposed 
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policy, as those factors can result in more supporters, greater pressure, and 
voters for the policy. In this paper, the engagement and interplay among these 
factors will be surveyed to present an analytical narrative of the enactment of 
the Retail Trade Liberalization Law or R.A. . Th e study will focus on how 
the integral factors worked together to bring about the law.
Results and Discussion
Context
In , the Philippine Congress passed a landmark law, R.A. , 
otherwise known as the Retail Trade Nationalization Act. Th e law’s protectionist 
policy was designed to break the control of aliens in the retail trade business, as 
the retail sector was considered a critical segment of the economy. In particular, 
the intention was to prevent Chinese retailers, who were not citizens, from 
controlling the industry. As aptly observed by Agpalo (), the primary 
irritating factor that instigated the nationalization of the retail trade was the 
alien domination of the industry. Th e enactment of the law was in keeping 
with the rising nationalist sentiment at the time, that vital industries must be 
in the hands of citizens. 
 With the advent of the s, the eff ectiveness as well as soundness of 
R.A.  was questioned. First, the critics argued that the policy had outlived 
its usefulness. Th e law was designed to protect Filipino retailers from the 
dominance of Chinese immigrant retailers, who at the time controlled around 
 of the industry (Agpalo, ). But with mass naturalization, in particular 
with Chinese marrying Filipinos, alien retailers became citizens. Hence, 
absorption of the Chinese ironically made the protectionist policy ineff ectual 
against them. An unintended consequence of the assimilation process was that 
R.A.  protected the Filipino-Chinese that it originally intended to exclude 
and shielded them against foreign competition.
Second, the critics argued that the policy did not translate into growth in 
the retail trade industry. Th e law was in tune with the economic independence 
strategy, where development was achieved through government protection and 
intervention. In this strategy, the government needed to ensure that the retail 
trade industry was fi rmly under Filipino control. However, after four decades of 
implementing R.A. , the Philippine retail sector could grow to only . 
of the gross domestic product (GDP) compared with the approximately  
standard among Southeast Asian countries that had fully opened up their retail 
trade sector (Patalinghug, ). Th e data show that the Philippine retail trade 
industry was lagging behind and that there was more room for growth.
Both insights on R.A.  were underpinned by the global paradigm shift 
in economic thinking. From the s onward, neoliberalism had become the 
dominant economic philosophy, as most countries adopted liberal policies in 
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their pursuit of development. Following the core liberal economic principles of 
deregulation, privatization, foreign investment, and free trade, the post-EDSA 
Philippine governments have steadily embraced policies such as lowering of 
tariff , loosening of foreign exchange controls, and opening the banking sector 
to foreign investments. Th us, it is logical to expect the retail trade industry to 
accept liberalization and thus follow the liberalization of the other sectors of 
the economy. Moreover, affi  liation with the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) has strengthened the commitment of 
the Philippine government to liberalize the economy.
Th ese premises ushered in the clamor for the repeal of R.A. . Th e 
economic think tanks of the Estrada administration called for the scrapping of 
the policy. Th ey argued that reforming the retail trade law was long overdue and 
the protectionist policy was no longer in tune with the times. For instance, the 
advent of Internet retailing made it very diffi  cult for countries to prevent foreign 
businesses from selling directly to their people. Th e economic managers from 
the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) stressed that the 
timing for making drastic policy change was right. Opening up the remaining 
protectionist industry, the country would be sending a strong signal to the 
world that it was serious in embracing free trade and that the liberalist economic 
policies of the government had continuity and consistency—with the Estrada 
administration continuing the liberalization program of the previous regimes. 
Moreover, the timing was also right to take the bold action of liberalizing the 
retail trade sector. As the country in Southeast Asia that was least aff ected 
by the  fi nancial crisis, the Philippines was in a good position to attract 
foreign investors while other Southeast Asian countries were still reeling from 
the eff ects of the crisis.
Stakeholders
 In the process of repealing the Retail Trade Nationalization Act, the 
stakeholders took one of two positions: those in favor of allowing foreign 
investors in the retail business and those who wanted to keep the retail trade 
sector exclusively to Filipinos. Th e fi rst group comprised those proposing policy 
change and liberalization or opening of the retail trade while the second group 
opposed the change and advocated the continuation of the protectionist policy 
in the retail trade.
 Th e executive agencies were at the forefront of the eff ort to promote policy 
change. Because the bill was sponsored by the administration, executive agencies 
such as the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Department of 
Finance (DOF), NEDA, the Board of Investments (BOI), and the Philippine 
Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) actively participated in crafting and 
deliberating on the bill. Th e bill was supported by the main consumer group 
in the country, the Consumer Union of the Philippines (CUP); international 
business groups, such as the American Chamber of Commerce, the European 
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Chamber of Commerce, and the Australian and New Zealand Chambers of 
Commerce; and local business groups, such as the Philippine Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry and the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers 
of Commerce and Industry. On the other side, the key opposing groups that 
actively participated in the policy deliberations were mostly retail business 
organizations and their affi  liates, such as the Kilusan Tungo sa Pambasang 
Tangkilikan (KATAPAT), the National Economy Protection Association 
(NEPA), Philippine Retailers Association (PRA), the Chamber of Filipino 
Retailers (CFR), the Philippine Association of Supermarkets Inc. (PASI), the 
Philippine Franchise Association (PFA), and the National Market Vendors 
Cooperatives (NAMVESCO).
 Th e proponents for the liberalization of the retail trade were in consensus 
that opening the industry to foreign investors was the right economic strategy. 
However, there were also disagreements among them. For instance, a major 
divergence was in the form of the safety net mechanism that must be incorporated 
in the policy. Two positions took shape: one was for a minimum capitalization 
requirement for foreign investors, and the other was for an assessment of the 
track record of the foreign investors. On one hand, the DTI, the BOI, and the 
DOF pushed for the minimum capital requirement of $ million for  
foreign equity, $, to less than $ million for  Filipino and  
foreign equity, and less than $, for  Filipino equity. On the other 
hand, the main sponsor of the bill, Senator Sergio Osmeña III and the NEDA 
were for examining the track record of foreign investors. Th ey argued that the 
focus should not be on quantity, but on the quality of people coming in, as 
quality investors would be more inclined to expand their business activity after 
they have tested the waters, so to speak. 
 Th ose opposed to the bill were in agreement that liberalizing the retail 
trade would be harmful to Filipino retailers and to the economy. Th eir common 
theme was to block the passage of the repealing bill. However, there were also 
diff erences in the position of the groups. For instance, PFA was against repealing 
the law, yet it accepted the inevitability of liberalization. Th us, the members 
pleaded for partial rather than full liberalization of the industry. PRA admitted 
that liberalization was good; however, the members believed that the timing 
was wrong, as the country was still reeling from the Asian fi nancial crisis.
 Th e proposed bill was controversial. Stakeholders considered it radical as 
the change would constitute a policy shift from protectionism to liberalism. 
Among the stakeholders, the distribution of costs and benefi ts was delineated. 
Th e perceived principal gainers from the repeal of the policy were the Filipino 
consumers, manufacturers, farmers, and small retailers, particularly the operators 
of sari-sari stores or small neighborhood convenience stores. On the other hand, 
the perceived biggest losers with the entry of foreign retailers were the local 
medium-sized and big retailers. It was thought that the costs would be borne 
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solely by these groups, which would lose their monopoly of the local market 
and the government protection against direct foreign competition that they 
had been enjoying since .
 Th e perceived costs and benefi ts also created a dilemma. On one side, 
the losses would be immediately felt and concentrated on the medium-sized 
and large retail businesses; on the other side, the gains would take a longer 
period to be felt and would spread to a very broad mass of people. In eff ect, 
it was believed that the costs would be shouldered by a relatively small sector 
of the economy while the benefi ts would be felt by the whole society itself, as 
anyone can be identifi ed as a consumer. On the part of the Filipino retailers, 
the dynamics generated a strong motivation to mobilize collective action 
against the bill. Th eir collective action was deemed infl uential as the sector 
was known to be well organized, fi nancially well-off , and politically connected. 
Th is strength was exemplifi ed by their capacity to block the bill a number of 
times since  and by their passionate and well-orchestrated appeal during 
the legislative deliberations.
Rationalization
 Th e opponents of the policy change argued that R.A.  was still valid at 
the time (s). Th ey said that the retail trade industry, as a critical sector of the 
economy, must be protected against foreign competition and must be controlled 
by Filipinos who have a permanent stake in the well-being of the country. Th ey 
also were skeptical of the outcome of competition, as they foresaw a one-sided 
contest. Th e entry of foreign retailers with their capital and technological and 
other advantages could easily translate into uneven competition. For instance, 
they could use their fi nancial muscle to resort to predatory pricing to eliminate 
competition. In addition, some in the opposition strongly believed that local 
retailers were still unprepared and needed some more time to get ready for 
competition. Th ey suggested that Filipino retailers be given time to allow them 
to adjust.
  For the opposition, pressing on with policy change would put many local 
retailers out of business. Th ey predicted that massive displacements and closures 
would ensue, resulting in net job losses in the retail trade sector. Th e increase 
in unemployment would eclipse any gains in the reduction of prices of goods 
brought about by competition. To rationalize their position, they cited studies 
such as “When Corporations Rule the World,” which discusses the phenomenon 
called “Wal-Martization,” where the entry of mega global retailers in a particular 
locality causes sales of local stores to go down and local retail businesses to 
perish (Korten, ). Th ey warned that the entry of foreign retailers would not 
automatically reduce prices, given the multitude of components that determine 
the price of goods (e.g., transportation cost, utilities, raw materials). If foreign 
retailers deemed the cost of operation high, then prices would not go down. 
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Moreover, some opposing lawmakers were suspicious of the move to fast-track 
the repeal of R.A. . For instance, Congressman Wigberto Tañada suspected 
that the action of the administration and its allies had something to do with 
the release of loans to the government, as international fi nancial institutions 
had made the passage of the law a condition for the release of the loans.
 Others tried to block the liberalization of the retail trade industry on 
constitutional grounds. Th e main argument, as expressed by Congressman 
Erico Aumentado, was that repealing the law would violate the Constitution, 
specifi cally article , section , which states that “the State shall develop a self-
reliant and independent national economy eff ectively controlled by Filipinos”; 
article , section , which states that “the State shall protect Filipino enterprises 
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices”; and article , section 
, which states that “the congress shall enact measures that will encourage 
the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly-owned by 
Filipinos.” 
 Th e UP Law Center sustained the opposition’s contention by expressing 
the opinion that allowing alien participation in the retail industry would negate 
the constitutional mandate that the economy should be eff ectively controlled by 
Filipinos. However, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion no., dated 
December , , signed by Secretary Serafi n Cuevas, gave a contradicting 
position, as it declared that the bill at hand had no constitutional infi rmity. 
Th e DOJ found no legal or constitutional obstacle to the opening of the retail 
trade sector to foreign investors. Moreover, the DOJ also acknowledged that 
the policy change was within the powers of Congress to make, as the legislature 
has the authority and discretion, subject to those expressly reserved by the 
Constitution for Filipinos (i.e., public utilities, natural resources, mass media, 
and educational institutions), to determine the type or manner of investments 
open to foreigners. 
 In contrast, the proponents for policy change argued that the fundamental 
premise for repealing R.A.  was that the protectionist policy resulted in 
an industry controlled by few players. Th e oligopoly created brought about 
the decline in the comparative and competitive advantage of the industry. 
Consequently, consumers were made to pay for the ineffi  ciency of Filipino 
retailers, and this ineffi  ciency translated into high prices and low-quality goods. 
To deal with the problem as well as to break the control of the cartel, the industry 
needed to be subjected to healthy competition. As there were not enough big 
local capitalists who were willing to invest and challenge the dominance of 
the few controlling players in the retail industry, it became necessary to invite 
foreign retailers. Th us, the retail trade business must be exposed to the full force 
of foreign competition—the more players, the better for the industry.
  As the central justifi cation for policy change, the promotion of competition 
in the retail trade industry was theoretically rationalized by the concept of a 
contestable market. In describing the concept, Mario Lamberte of the PIDS 
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stated, “It doesn’t matter whether you have two producers or one thousand 
producers or one producer. What is important is that one will behave like 
a competitor. And the only way we can force him to behave like a perfect 
competitor is to threaten him.” Th e theory implies that what is important is the 
presence of countervailing forces to guarantee competition and ensure effi  ciency 
among the players in the industry. NEDA Director General Felipe Medalla 
affi  rmed that an effi  cient operator forces other operators to be effi  cient as well. 
He cited the case of Malaysia, where evidence shows that with the entry of foreign 
investors, the domestic enterprises showed much higher productivity. Here in 
the Philippines, liberalization in banking, telecommunications, shipping, and 
insurance showed benefi cial impacts. For instance, in the telecommunication 
industry, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), which 
held a virtual monopoly in the past, had become more effi  cient in the face of 
competition. Th us, the “transformation” of PLDT benefi ted the consumers 
as well as the company. As the joke goes: in the past, it took PLDT  years 
to provide one with a telephone that had no dial tone. Now, it gives you a 
telephone, complete with dial tone, in  days. 
 Th us, liberalization of the retail trade sector was expected to help address 
the following major problems confronting the country: 
. Economic problem. Th e net eff ect of the entry of foreign retailers could 
be an increase in economic activity and employment, as expansion of the 
economy could be greater than displacement. For instance, tourism would 
be promoted because the greater availability of goods ranging from the 
cheapest in the market to high-end products could create a well-rounded 
shopping profi le (e.g., new shopping capital in Asia) that would make the 
country more attractive to tourists. Moreover, the expansion of the industry 
could lead to the creation of jobs through subcontracting arrangements 
with the retail outlets for the supply of raw materials. 
. Financial problem. Th e defi ciency in local capital investment would be 
resolved by the infl ux of foreign capital. Domestic savings are too low to 
be the source of capitalization. As Senator Ralph Recto noted during the 
deliberations on the bill, in  the gross domestic savings as a percentage 
of the gross national product (GNP) was only  in the Philippines 
compared with  in Indonesia,  in Th ailand,  in Malaysia, 
and  in Singapore. 
. Management problem. Th e pressure from competition would force local 
retailers to be effi  cient, innovative, and fl exible. Th e presence of foreign 
players could also expose the retail sector to newer management systems 
and technology transfer. Th e archetype of this development is Jollibee, 
the local fast-food company that adopted and utilized the technology and 
expertise of McDonalds, its main competitor, to edge out the latter in the 
fast-food business. 
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. Infl ation problem. Competition and the quest to gain market share would 
help bring down the prices of commodities. Lower prices of goods, if 
attained, could translate into less pressure from the demand for an increase 
in salaries and into more savings to the consumers.
. Export market problem. Th ere would be reciprocity in opening the retail 
trade sector. It would follow that opening the economy would lead other 
countries to also open their market to Filipino products. Moreover, the 
entry of global retailers would enable them to identify locally produced 
products that could be sold in their other retail establishments around the 
world.
 Liberalization of the retail trade sector was also seen as a means to level 
the playing fi eld for manufacturers and retailers. Th e NEDA argued that in 
the status quo, the manufacturers’ bargaining position was weaker than the 
retailers’ as the former had much more limited choices of big retailers to use. 
One consequence of the current practice, according to the DTI, was that 
manufacturers were usually paid either after  to  days, instead of outright 
cash, or only for goods sold by the retailers in the case of consignment. Another 
consequence was that small manufacturers had little chance of penetrating 
the market. Th is is exemplifi ed by the case of Daila Herbal, where the small 
entrant manufacturer of soap was asked to pay for a space in a supermarket. 
Th is dilemma was echoed by Senator Osmeña who said that to put up a display 
inside Rustan’s Department Store, a small-time manufacturer must pay P, 
per square meter. Th us, if there were more retailers, the manufacturers could 
have more choices and they could look for retailers who could pay in cash or 
provide a better deal.
 Furthermore, small retailers, who according to the DTI comprised , 
were the largest segment of the retail industry and were projected to be minimally 
aff ected by the policy change. Th e sari-sari stores have distinct advantages over 
huge local retailers that the former could exploit when confronted by the infl ux 
of foreign retailers. Sari-sari stores are location-specifi c and occupy a special 
market niche based on convenience and unique services. For instance, sari-sari 
stores sell goods piecemeal (e.g., one can buy a stick of cigarette) and off er 
exceptional credit terms (e.g., payment is made after the buyer receives his 
salary). In addition, small retailers would also have more alternatives to source 
their goods. Sari-sari stores are clients of big retailers because their sourcing 
volume is too small to be serviced directly by manufacturers. Th e experience of 
Makro illustrates this case. Makro’s entry signifi cantly improved the sourcing 
of cheaper supplies for sari-sari stores.
 On the issue of the displacement that competition might bring, Director 
General Medalla admitted that “competition brings about greater effi  ciency 
although competition does displace people. So the question really there is 
how you balance benefi ts from competition with the cost of dislocation [that] 
2010 © University of the Philippines Mindanao
33BRILLO | BANWA VOL. 7, NO. 1 (2010): 21–39
competition brings about.” Th e adverse consequence, however, was portrayed 
as acceptable since overall, the net eff ect of policy change is deemed positive 
for the economy. He added that the feared displacement was overblown, as the 
entry of foreign retailers does not equate to zero-sum game—the obliteration 
of local retailers. One reason is that the opening up of the retail trade sector, 
based on the experience of other countries, does not automatically result in a 
fl ood of foreign retailers coming to the country; usually, it takes some time for 
them to come in. Filipino retailers also had some advantages that they could 
use against foreign retailers, e.g., familiarity with Filipino preferences, local 
culture, market terrain, and business climate. Moreover, there was no guarantee 
that foreign retailers considered as big players compared with local retailers 
would be successful in their business venture. For instance, as pointed out 
by Senator Osmeña, global giant retailers such as Wal-Mart and J.C. Penney 
failed miserably in their venture in Indonesia, as local retailers repositioned and 
reinvented themselves to successfully compete with foreign retailers. Another 
is the experience with the Foreign Investments Act of . Th e experience 
proved that the initial fear—the entry of foreign investors in the country would 
gobble up the local businesses—was unfounded. 
Political Resources and Concessions
 In the move to repeal R.A. , the Estrada administration certifi ed the 
bill as urgent in Congress. Th e position of the administration was formally 
conveyed to the lawmakers through a letter sent by Secretary Jose Pardo, 
informing them that President Joseph Estrada expected the bill to be prioritized 
by Congress. In line with the directive, the government agencies, particularly 
the DTI and the NEDA, provided the information and materials needed in 
support of the passage of the bill. Th e materials were fed to the sponsoring 
lawmakers to enhance their knowledge and arguments during deliberations in 
Congress. Th e executive agencies also provided the working draft of the bill 
and served as “consultants” in the fi nal drafting of the law. For instance, the 
BOI was in constant touch with the lawmakers from the committee hearings 
up to the Bicameral Conference Committee.
 A critical factor in the enactment of the law was the perceived infl uence 
of the Offi  ce of the President over the lawmakers. Despite the limitations 
imposed by the  Constitution, the executive continues to hold sway 
over Congress. In Philippine politics, the unwritten rule is that the legislature 
follows the president, not the other way around. An example of this is the 
continuing infl uence of the president on the selection of leaders in both 
chambers of Congress. Th e person elected as the Speaker of the House or the 
Senate President usually has the blessings of the sitting president. Another is 
the legislators’ perennial practice of climbing on the president’s bandwagon 
by affi  liating themselves or their parties. Th e infl uence of the president over 
Congress emanates from the power over the purse, in particular, the power to 
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control the release of budgetary funds. In an arena where patronage politics is 
prevalent, the “pork barrel,” which is used to fund the projects of lawmakers, is 
perceived to be crucial to their political survival (Caoili, ). Th e executive 
infl uence over the repeal of R.A.  could be inferred from the retort of 
Senator Osmeña against the continuous and vehement objection of the retailers 
group to the bill—that if they want to block the bill, they should go and talk 
to Malacañang. Th e statement revealed the real force behind policy change. 
Furthermore, the support of President Estrada, who was still very popular at 
the time, made the opposing lawmakers realize the diffi  culty of blocking the 
passage of the bill. Recognizing the situation, the opposing lawmakers, as an 
alternative recourse, focused their eff orts on infl uencing the content of the 
bill.
 An issue in the repealing bill that needed concession was the safety net 
concern. Th e objectors argued for a guarantee that would provide security to 
Filipino retailers. To address the apprehension, particularly the fear on the 
psychological level among the Filipino retailers, the proponents agreed to 
incorporate in the bill the following safeguard proposals: 
. Retail trade enterprises with a paid-up capital of less than $. million are 
reserved exclusively for Filipino citizens and corporations.
. Foreign investors interested in acquiring shares of existing local retailers 
may purchase only up to a maximum of  of the equity within the fi rst 
two years from the eff ectivity of the repealing law. 
. Retail trade enterprises where foreign ownership exceeds  must off er a 
minimum of  of their equity to Filipinos through any stock exchange 
in the Philippines within  years from their start of operations. 
. Th e DTI must prequalify all foreign retailers before they are allowed to 
conduct business in the Philippines. For instance, to preclude fl y-by-night 
retailers, the DTI requires foreign retailers to have at least  retailing 
branches in operation anywhere around the world as well as have a -year 
track record in retailing. 
. Only foreign retailers coming from countries that allow the entry of Filipino 
retailers would be permitted to engage in business. 
. At least  of the stock inventory of foreign retailers, after  years from 
the eff ectivity of the law, must be Philippine made. 
. Qualifi ed foreign retailers are not allowed to use rolling stores or sales 
representatives, or engage in door-to-door selling or the restaurant business, 
or run sari-sari stores.
 Th e key proponents of repealing the bill, however, did not believe that 
such safety net provisions were necessary. For instance, the NEDA stated that 
if the law would put in too many ifs, buts, whys and wherefores, then the 
government would be sending a signal to the world that we are not serious in 
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opening the retail sector. Nevertheless, the proponents accepted the reality that 
radical policy change arouses deep-seated suspicion and distrust. Moreover, 
the consensus among them was that without the stipulations, passing the bill 
in both Houses would be much more diffi  cult. To mitigate the complications, 
the proponents decided to be practical and accommodated the demands. Th e 
importance of concessions is summed up in the statement of Senator Osmeña: 
“I just did it to appease some of the objectors to the bill.” Th us, the compromise 
assured the enactment of R.A.  and the repeal of R.A. .
Public Perception
 Th e proponents of R.A.  framed the policy as a consumer welfare act 
and as an antidote to an ineffi  cient industry. Th ey agreed that the industry had 
been enjoying protection for a long time and that this protection had given 
rise to cartelization where the few big retailers, without genuine competition, 
enjoyed large profi ts at the expense of the consumers. Opening the industry 
to foreign competition would, in the long run, result in lower prices, better 
services, and higher quality of goods. For instance, Senator Recto stated that 
the “retail trade bill does not intend to solve all these problems; nevertheless, 
it is a step forward in promoting effi  ciency in the economy. If we would like to 
ensure that the cost of production, that the total economy is effi  cient, one way 
of doing this is to promote competition.” Th us, the repeal of R.A.  was 
publicized as critical for the sitting Congress to enact if the legislators wanted 
to empower the Filipino consumers and revitalize the retail trade sector.
 Th e policy proponents also took deliberate actions to counteract the 
propaganda of the opposing stakeholders. For instance, on the perceived 
detrimental eff ect on the local retailers, the advocates declared that the Filipino 
consumers’ welfare took precedence over all concerns, including the interest of a 
sector of the economy. Th ey admitted that policy change would have pains, but 
the gains would be larger than the costs. On the issue of nationalism equated 
with protectionism, where the opponents of the policy argued that Filipino 
retailers should be amply shielded against foreign competition, the proponents 
were quick to spread the view that protectionism was archaic and equivalent 
to economic stagnation. Furthermore, they propagated the idea that it would 
be futile for the country to oppose the global march of liberalism and that the 
only logical move was to abandon the protectionist policy and embrace the 
liberalist policy.
Concluding Comments
 In the beginning, the context was the driving force that propelled the 
demand for the policy of liberalization. Th e global paradigm shift toward 
economic liberalism created an atmosphere ideal for policy change. Th e policy 
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proponents argued that, as a protectionist policy, R.A.  was passé and 
would not promote the economic development of the country. In the process, 
the stakeholders formed two groups: those for policy change or for liberalizing 
the retail trade and those for the status quo or for maintaining protectionism in 
the industry. Opening the retail trade sector to foreign retailers was contentious 
as the move constituted a radical change in policy. Compounding matters, the 
perceived costs and benefi ts created a collective action dilemma, as the losses 
would immediately be felt and concentrated on a particular sector while the 
gains would be long term and will spread to a broad group of people. 
 Th e collective action dilemma in part was off set by better rationalization 
for policy change. Th e rationale was potent, as it was well grounded theoretically 
as well as reinforced empirically. Th e theoretical foundation was based on the 
concept of a contestable market, where the presence of a genuine competitor 
is necessary to ensure competition and an effi  cient industry. Empirically, 
liberalization of the retail trade sector was off ered as an eff ective way of addressing 
the economic ills faced by the country. In addition, the relative successes of 
past liberalist policies in other industries (e.g., banking, telecommunications, 
shipping, and insurance) had a strong persuasive appeal. Th us, the potential 
adverse consequences of policy change were rendered acceptable as the net eff ect 
would be benefi cial to the economy.
 Because policy change was an administration bill, the resources of the 
government were put behind it. A critical factor is the compelling infl uence of 
the president over Congress. Th is advantage was supplemented by information 
disseminated to counteract the opposing propaganda as well as address 
the public’s apprehension. Moreover, concessions added fl exibility to the 
proponents, as they used compromise on the contents of the law to appease and 
accommodate the demands of the opposition. All those factors worked together 
to bring about policy change. Th us, the enactment of R.A.  exemplifi es the 
dynamics among the several essential factors in the policymaking process, as this 
engagement and interplay guaranteed the passage of the law. Th e experience 
illustrates the complexities of a radical policy shift as well as the intricacies of 
policymaking in the Philippines.
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